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This paper describes the monetary policy response of countries during the inter-war period. 
How did central banks react to the Great Depression? How did countries balance the externals 
demands of the gold standard with domestic policy pressures? What was the optimal level of 
international policy coordination? We use weekly data over the period 1925-1936 to estimate 
central bank rate reaction functions for a panel of 22 countries during the inter-war gold 
standard. The estimates suggest to us changing objectives for monetary policy. Countries 
moved away from the sole objective of convertibility and towards a more ‘modern’ monetary 
policy based on exchange rate stabilization, but not yet output stabilization or even modern 
price level targeting. Importantly, this move to exchange rate stabilization was accompanied 
by the formation of monetary policy blocs around pre-existing economic relations. Countries’ 
interwar policy choices offer lessons for countries remaining in or choosing to join the 
European Monetary Union today. 
JEL Code: N14, E43, E58. 
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With the arrival of the 10
th anniversary of the European Central Bank (ECB) on June 1
st, 
2008 and the 10
th anniversary of the Euro, which was introduced as an accounting 
currency on January 1
st, 1999, followed by coin and note issues on January 1
st, 2002, 
economists have taken the opportunity to look back over the past 10 years to assess the 
successes and failures of the Euro system.  
Many scholars have lauded the accomplishments of the Euro; fostering trade and 
financial integration, raising living standards across Europe, and last but not least 
ensuring that European neighbors are now locked in a system that has secured peace and 
stability over the past 60 years. Supporters have also pointed to the impressive feat of the 
European Central Bank of establishing itself as a credible key player in international 
financial markets, and to the creation of the Euro as new international reserve currency 
that now challenges the dominance of the US dollar (Chinn and Frankel, 2007). 
Skeptics of the Euro system, however, point out that the Euro system is flawed as long as 
the Eurozone cannot be considered an Optimum Currency Area (OCA); and as long as 
OCA criteria such as labor market integration remain largely unchanged. The creation of 
a unified monetary policy, while maintaining national political autonomy and national 
fiscal policies, leaves the system vulnerable and ill-fitted to swiftly respond to economic 
crises. Some have even speculated about the improbable but not impossible break-up of 
the Euro area (Eichengreen, 2007), and have pointed out that while the Euro had a 
positive impact on economic integration, the measurable economic effects are small, and 
today’s Europe might not look all that different if history had taken a different course 
(Eichengreen and Boltho, 2008). Another aspect of European monetary policy that has 
drawn continuous criticism is the two-pillar strategy with its focus on economic and 
monetary analysis and its strong emphasis on price stability implemented by the 
European Central Bank. Various researches have suggested that the ECB abandon its   3
                                                       
primary focus on price stability, citing the tradeoff between low inflation and faster 
growth, as well as the arbitrariness of the two percent cut-off.
1  
Over the past year, the ongoing financial crisis has prompted scholars to take a fresh look 
at the viability of the Eurozone. European Monetary Union (EMU) member countries 
have begun to question further enlargement, while aspiring members in Eastern Europe, 
facing large capital withdrawals and sharp declines in their domestic currency, have 
approached the Eurozone asking for financial support. But while the current financial 
crisis is often described as the first real test of the EMU, it is not the first crisis that has 
shaped the experience of the member countries. Put into broader context, the formation of 
the EMU came about as a reaction of European central banks to the 1992 exchange rate 
crisis. Faced with the collapse of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in the wake of 
recession, a group of European countries chose to form a monetary union and deepen the 
process of European economic integration under way since the 1950s. However, not all 
member states of the European Union opted for monetary unification. Rather, Denmark, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom developed a novel framework for the conduct of 
independent monetary policy, known today as inflation targeting. This raises an 
important economic question: Why did some countries join the EMU when others did 
not? Why did the Netherlands adopt the Euro, while Sweden chose to pursue an 
independent monetary policy based on inflation targeting? And what might the EMU 
look like as a result of the ongoing financial troubles?  
In this paper, we look back and compare the challenges that central banks and 
policymakers faced in 1992 and are facing today, with the experience of countries during 
the interwar years. In the interwar period, many countries struggled to redefine their 
monetary policies. Key issues for the interwar economies were the establishment of 
credibility, striking the right balance between international versus domestic policy 
objectives, and achieving an optimal level of international policy cooperation.
2 Countries 
had the choice of remaining in or leaving the interwar gold exchange standard, where the 
latter implied the challenge of how to design monetary policy in the face of its collapse. 
 
1 Compare, among others,  Cecchetti and O’Sullivan, 2003. 
2 For a detailed discussion of different countries’ experiences with the interwar gold standard, please refer 
to Eichengreen (1992).   4
All of these are questions that have also concerned the EMU member countries and their 
European neighbors for the past ten years. Moreover, they will likely continue to be 
discussed in the future, especially as new members aspire to join the Euro zone.  
A convenient starting point for a theoretical analysis is the monetary policy trilemma. 
Policymakers in open economies face a macroeconomic trilemma, as they are confronted 
with three typically desirable, yet contradictory, objectives: first to stabilize the exchange 
rate, second to enjoy free international capital mobility, and third to engage in monetary 
policy oriented towards domestic goals such as output stabilization or price level 
stabilization. Over time, the constraints implied by this trilemma were typically binding, 
with some qualifications, as shown in Obstfeld et al. (2004a). However, when countries 
faced major macroeconomic shocks, they often proved reluctant to let exchange rates 
float and/or impose capital controls. There is evidence for a ‘fear of floating’ among 
smaller or less developed countries that might stem from both, a lack of credibility and a 
country’s heavy dependency on international trade and foreign capital (Calvo and 
Reinhart 2002). Hence, in spite of growing domestic pressure for a reorientation of 
monetary policy away from multilateral exchange rate stabilization and towards unilateral 
objectives such as output stabilization, countries may opt for a third way: the formation 
of monetary policy blocks along the lines of Optimum Currency Areas.  
Three specific questions stand at the center of our analysis: what were the key monetary 
policy objectives to which interwar countries subjected their policy, and how did these 
targets change in response to the Great Depression? Second, do we observe the formation 
of monetary policy blocks over time, either with the rise of the gold standard or with its 
demise? And third, what factors determined the selection of countries into these blocks? 
In our empirical analysis we focus on the determinants of central bank rates over the 
period 1925 to 1936 and explore how these determinants changed over time. This 
approach obviously implies several simplifications. On the one hand side, bank rates 
might only imperfectly reflect a central bank’s reaction, given other policy instruments. 
On the other side, various policy objectives can motivate similar reaction function. 
However, several authors have stressed the relevance of bank rates during the interwar 
period before us (among others Eichengreen et al. 1985). Given data availability and   5
given the major shocks during the period under investigation, our main aim here is not to 
test hypotheses based in theory, but rather to explore patterns in the data in order to 
develop new hypotheses.  
In a first step we estimate central bank reaction functions for our sample countries, 
following a simple empirical framework based on Tullio and Wolters (2007). We extend 
this framework to take domestic policy objectives into account. Next, we explore whether 
central bank reaction functions differed across countries, especially if some countries 
behaved like “anchor countries” in the sense of Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002). We 
first use Granger Causality tests to identify potential “anchors” and then re-estimate 
reaction functions for these countries and the rest for our sample separately. This strategy 
allows us to test for the idea that monetary policy blocks formed around these existing 
economic relations with anchor countries. Finally, in a third step we explore the factors 
that determined a country’s selection into one of these policy blocks.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section two we start with some brief 
historical background on monetary policy in the interwar period. In section three we 
describe our main data and the empirical approach by Tullio and Wolters (2007). This 
section also contains the basic analysis of reaction functions. In section four we explore 
whether there were “anchor” countries that can be separated from others and re-estimate 
the reaction functions including possible effects from adherence to a monetary policy 
block. In section five, we explore the factors that determined a country’s selection into 
one policy block rather than another. Section six concludes.  
 
2. Some Background on the Interwar Period 
The interwar period between the two world wars (1919-1939) was a defining era for 
modern macroeconomics. It was then, that many countries transitioned to independent 
central banks and began formulating monetary policy in the modern sense. Coming from 
the stability of the pre-war classical gold standard, the countries in the inter-war period 
struggled to re-establish an international monetary system. The changing political 
environment and the economic shocks of the 1920s and 1930s, made it difficult to 
commit to the goal of exchange rate stability, and put the priorities of maintaining an   6
international exchange rate arrangement over domestic challenges such as low economic 
growth and high unemployment. The result of this dichotomy between domestic and 
international policy goals was the creation of the inter-war gold exchange standard, a 
modified gold standard system that in essence only lasted for a mere six years between 
1925 and 1931 before it collapsed into a world of trade and currency blocks.  
Prior to 1925, many countries struggled with hyperinflation and high volatility of 
exchange rates. Despite the disruptions caused by WWI, there was widespread agreement 
in 1919 that a new international monetary system should be created, again based on fixed 
exchange rate and anchored to gold. However, the return to such a system was 
complicated by the burden of reparation payments and the entangled web of accumulated 
debts that remained from the War (Feinstein et al, 1997). Many countries were in dire 
need of international support to finance reconstruction. As the US was the only country 
that was in a position to provide financial assistance, the center of power had quietly 
shifted from London to New York (Kindleberger, 1976). Additionally, several countries 
feared that a return to gold at the old exchange rate parities would bring widespread 
deflation. The inter-war gold standard emerged as an ad hoc compromise, after Britain 
had decided to return to gold at the pre-war parity in April of 1925. Other countries 
followed, and by the end of the year, many countries had once again adopted gold as their 
monetary anchor.  
There were important policy differences between the inter-war and the classical gold 
standard, aimed at remedying the threat of deflation.  The interwar gold standard operated 
as an exchange standard system based on key currencies. Only the currencies of the 
center countries were directly pegged to gold. Countries on the periphery pegged their 
currencies to the currencies of the center countries and also held their reserves partially in 
gold and partially in the currencies of the center countries. This allowed a one-time 
expansion of the world money stock. Adopting the gold standard brought stability to the 
international financial markets and introduced a brief period of economic growth. 
Nevertheless the system could not repeat the classical gold standard’s success, and its 
problems soon became apparent.   7
The breakup of the inter-war regime, often dated with Britain’s departure from gold in 
September 1931, even though some countries stayed on the gold standard until 1936, is 
attributed to a series of causes: first, the ‘exchange’ nature of the gold standard led to an 
inherent imbalance. The system placed pressure on the center countries to maintain their 
gold convertibility, but countries on the periphery, which held their reserves in the 
currencies of the center countries, possessed no enforcement mechanism over the center 
countries. As the world economy grew, and with it the demand for reserve currency, the 
center countries were tempted to increase their money stock. But increasing the liquidity 
of the reserve currency entailed the risk of a crisis of confidence for the entire system 
because it jeopardized the center currencies’ link to gold (Triffin, 1947). 
Several other problems contributed to its demise. The interwar gold standard was 
characterized by structural problems and persistent gold imbalances between the center 
countries. France and the United States had policies to sterilize gold inflows, leading to 
the accumulation of gold reserves in both countries. Britain, in contrast, suffered from 
large gold outflows. Unfortunately, the adjustment mechanism of the gold standard did 
not succeed in eliminating these surpluses and deficits in the balance of payments. Deficit 
countries were constrained by reserve losses and had to deflate in order to maintain fixed 
parities. Surplus countries, by contrast, allowed their foreign investments to increase 
without making an upward adjustment in their money supply or price levels. This led to a 
steady decline in world prices. These gold imbalances during the interwar years 
document the central banks’ lack of cooperation. Whereas countries in financial 
difficulties could borrow from their neighbors during the classical gold standard years, 
this international support was no longer available in the years after the war. A gold 
shortage in one country could therefore turn into a crisis of confidence for the entire 
system, rather than being solved cooperatively. This lack of leadership was aggravated by 
the shift of financial power from London to New York, which eliminated England’s 
capacity to maintain global balance through movements of its discount rate.  
 
In the face of the global economic crisis in the early 1930s, the interwar gold standard 
crumbled into different currency or monetary policy blocs (Eichengreen and Irwin 1996). 
The first group of countries to impose exchange controls in the face of the domestic   8
                                                       
crisis, and thereby effectively leaving the regime, included Hungary and Germany, 
followed by other south-central European countries in July 1931. Next was a group of 
countries following Britain off gold in September 1931 that included other 
Commonwealth members as well as the Scandinavian countries. Five countries remained 
on the gold standard until 1935/36, rallying around France. These included the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Poland. A key question here is which factors 
determined a country’s selection into one block rather than another. As argued in Ritschl 
and Wolf (2003) the formation of these currency blocks was endogenous to trade insofar 
as they were formed along the lines of preexisting trade networks. Here, we will extend 
this analysis to include institutional and geographical factors. Countries during the 
interwar years were acutely aware of their neighbors’ actions. For a small open economy 
on fixed exchange rates with open capital markets, the interest rate is determined in the 
world market. However, what countries are facing is not some obscure world interest 
rate, but a rate that is directly determined by the largest economies around. Interwar 
countries were aware of this process and even included this in their policy formulation. 
For Austria, for example, a report on the economic conditions to the League of Nations 
by WT Layton and Charles Rist recommended that “The Austrian bank rate had to stay 
above the rate of the countries that were granting the credit and maybe even above the 
German rate for Austria to get the international credits that the country needs.”
3  
 
While the inter-war gold standard of course differed from the EMU today, some parallels 
can be seen. A careful study of interwar economies can give some insights into the policy 
choices and challenges facing countries in the 1990s and the EMU today. In the 
following we focus on the key determinants for monetary policy in the interwar regime 
that follow from the challenges that were laid out in the previous section. In our 
conclusion we will draw some comparisons with the Euro.  
As mentioned before, the key policy challenges that interwar economies attempted to 
navigate were the adherence to the gold standard which brought stability and credibility, 
balancing the demands of the gold standard with domestic policy pressures, and 
 
3 League of Nations, Reports of the Commissioner 20, Vienna 1925. For a more extensive discussion of the 
monetary policies of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, see Wandschneider (2009)   9
                                                       
maintaining cooperation and the right level of coordination with neighboring or 
dominating countries in the region. The first two of these goals can be seen in light of the 
classic trilemma of monetary policy, where under open capital markets, countries have to 
choose between fixed exchange rates and a domestic monetary policy.
4 Under the 
exchange rate system of the interwar gold standard, countries attempted to balance the 
stability of the system with rising domestic pressures. Eichengreen (1992) and Simmons 
(1993), and more recently Wandschneider (2008) and Wolf (2008) have shown that the 
changing political landscape after World War I increased the pressure to orient monetary 
policy more towards domestic economic goals. If governments were willing to leave the 
gold standard, and would let the exchange rate depreciate, they would not be forced to 
compress domestic spending. However, in this case they would give up the inflation 
commitment and the ‘good housekeeping seal of approval’ that adherence to the gold 
standard would have entailed (Bordo, Edelstein, Rockoff, 1999).  
This conflict of domestic versus external objectives extends to the European Monetary 
Union. With the delegation of monetary policy to the ECB in Frankfurt, EMU members 
have given up the monetary policy tool for domestic purposes. Nevertheless, the 
implementation of structural policies to support this monetary policy remains with the 
national governments. The policy conflicts arising from the national interest are probably 
the biggest challenge for the future of the EMU today (Cecchetti and O’Sullivan, 2003) 
and these conflicts are likely to increase the larger the number of EU, and eventually 
EMU member countries. But the challenge of cooperation is not the only parallel between 
the interwar years and the Eurozone today. Adhering to the gold standard, interwar 
countries committed themselves to price stability as an implicit policy target. Under the 
gold standard, the dominant target was to stabilize the currency price of gold (the gold 
parity), by managing the money supply. Since the growth of international gold stocks was 
limited, money supply growth kept inflation low. Hence at least in the long run price 
stability was a target under gold. Moreover, price stability remained a policy target even 
when countries left gold, but may have lost its dominance over other targets. 
 
4 For an application of the trilemma to the interwar gold standard, see Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 
2004.   10
Under the interwar regime, central banks took on the key role of maintaining and 
stabilizing the international system. Independent central banks were therefore 
complements, rather than substitutes to the fixed exchange rate regime. The classical 
rules of the game prescribed countries to raise interest rates in the face of reserve losses 
but lower rates when reserves were high. Interwar countries in fact did not subject their 
central banks to these policies. As Eichengreen, Watson, and Grossman (1985) have 
shown, Britain pursued asymmetric interest policies, raising the rate in response to losses 
in reserves but failing to lower the rate following reserve gains. Moreover, they found an 
increased sensitivity in interest changes to domestic conditions, such as the cost of 
domestic credit.  Similarly Simmons (1996) finds evidence of violations of the rules of 
the game during the inter-war gold standard, when looking a panel of 15 countries. Her 
results show that countries with independent central banks placed more emphasis on 
domestic price stability than on the external adjustment process. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis: Central Bank Reaction Functions 1925-1936 
In the following, we use an unbalanced panel of data for a set of 22 interwar economies 
(Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the Unites States). For these 
countries, we have collected weekly and monthly bank rates, monthly cover ratios, 
exchange rates, inflation rates (calculated as percentage change in the consumer price 
index), monthly indices of industrial output, and data on exchange controls. Exchange 
rates, exchange control data and prices are taken from the League of Nations, Annual 
Yearbooks, 1925-1936/37. Cover ratios, bank rates and indices of industrial output were 
taken from Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistik der Weltwirtschaft 1934 and 1937.  
Following Tullio and Wolters (2007) we model changes in the official discount rate Δit of 
each central bank in our sample as a function of changes in the cover ratio Δct-1 and the 
percentage deviation of the exchange rate of a country’s currency with the US Dollar 
from its gold parity in the previous month denoted by w
E
t-1. The cover ratio is defined as 
the ratio of gold and convertible foreign exchange reserves of the central bank relative to   11
declines in industrial output.  
                                                       
M0, the circulation of banknotes and coins. Given this, we expect to find that changes in 
bank rates depend negatively on changes in the cover ratio, because an outflow of gold 
should have triggered an increase of bank rates.
5 Next, we expect that changes in bank 
rates depend positively on changes in deviations of the exchange rate from its gold parity, 
because an increase in the exchange rate indicates a devaluation of the local currency 
relative to the Gold dollar and hence a tendency of capital and gold to flow out of the 
country that should have triggered an increase in bank rates. Table 1 gives the results of 
this exercise, where we exclude the US from the sample and limit our attention to a 
balanced sample with a total of 1638 observations (21 countries over 78 months). 
 
(Table 1a about here) 
 
Consider Table 1, column 1. There is evidence that bank rates increased in outflows of 
gold and foreign exchange reserves relative to M0 and with exchange rate deviations 
below gold parities. As shown in columns 2 and 3 this result holds also if we allow for 
country-specific random or fixed effects. However, there are changes over time. On 
average over our sample we do not observe a systematic response to changes in cover 
ratios for the period up to 1931 (this is true also if we exclude France from the sample). 
Instead, we always find clear evidence that bank rates react to both exchange rate 
deviations from gold parities and changes in cover ratios for the period 1933-1936.  
These results pose more questions than they answer: why did countries apparently follow 
the rules of the game more closely in 1933 than before this, after most sample countries 
had actually left gold? In a next step, we extend the analysis by allowing bank rates to 
react to changes in prices and industrial production. If central banks cared about domestic 
economic conditions, they should have lowered interest rates in response to deflation and 
 
5 While we note that the opposite may not necessarily hold as countries tried to sterilize gold inflows during 
the interwar years (see Eichengreen et al. 1985), we don’t think that this has a major impact in our case, as 
most European countries experienced net-outflows of gold rather than inflows over the period under 
consideration. We add controls for the two countries that experienced major gold inflows (France and the 
US).    12
 
(Table 1b about here) 
 
As shown in table 1b, this finds empirical support only for the period 1925-1929, prior to 
the Great Depression when the interwar gold standard was still in operation. Again, the 
results seem to contradict conventional wisdom. There is little evidence that central banks 
followed the rules of the gold standard during the period when it was officially in 
operation; however we do find clear evidence for this from 1929 onwards, exactly when 
the gold standard started to collapse.  
 
4. Testing for Asymmetries 
Our previous analysis was based on the very strict (but common) assumption, that 
countries’ central banks followed in principle the same reaction function. There is plenty 
of anecdotal evidence that is at odds with this assumption. To start with, the Bank of 
England had most probably more discretion in setting interest rates than the Bank of 
Poland, for example. Next, as indicated above, a country like Austria or Hungary might 
have been more directly influenced by changes in bank rates in Germany than say 
changes in bank rates in England. To explore such asymmetries in reaction functions, we 
first estimate a large unrestricted VAR based on weekly rather than monthly central bank 
rates over all sample countries over the period 1925-1929 and compute generalized 
impulse response functions following Pesaran and Shin (1998). Based on this, we run a 
complete series of Granger Causality tests to identify central banks that affected the bank 
rates of other countries but were not systematically affected by any other country except 
its own lagged bank rates. Results from the Granger causality tests are reported in Table 
2.  
 
(Table 2 about here)   13
 
These results clearly identify some countries that had a relatively pronounced effect on 
others. In addition to the United States and Great Britain, which the economic history 
literature identifies as policy leaders at the time, especially German and France do not 
react to other countries but have massive effects on others. In the following analysis we 
therefore use, Germany, France, the UK and US as possible anchor countries for bank 
policy.  
Based on this evidence let us reformulate our question from section 3: what factors 
affected changes in the bank rates of these anchor countries and how in turn did these 
changes affect bank rates in other European countries, controlling for cover ratios, 
exchange rates and domestic conditions? Table 3 shows the reaction functions for each of 
the anchor countries (except the US, where exchange rate deviations are not defined).  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
We see that reaction functions differed widely. The strongest responses to changes in 
cover rates can be seen for Germany prior to 1932, reflecting desperate attempts of the 
Reichsbank to limit the loss of gold and foreign exchange in the crisis of 1931, but also 
earlier during the crisis of 1927. In stark contrast, France did not follow the rules of the 
game during the interwar years and apparently not only sterilized inflows of gold but 
even increased bank rates during in reaction to gold inflows. At the same time there is 
evidence for attempts to stabilize prices (Bordo and Hautcour, 2007). Yet another picture 
emerges for the UK. There is little evidence that the Bank of England responded to 
changes in the cover ratio or exchange rates by changes in bank rates, except during the 
period 1929-32, in response the devaluation of the pound was briefly countered by an 
increase in bank rates after September 1931. Moreover, this is the only period when the 
Bank of England reacted to changes in the price level.  
 
As indicated by the VARs and Granger Causality tests, other central banks responded   14
systematically to bank rates in these anchor countries. Hence, we now explore the 
reaction functions of the non-center countries, explicitly taking the role of the center 
countries into account. We first included all four anchor countries, with and without time 
interactions as additional explanatory variables in the regression. The results can be seen 
in Table 4. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
The results show that especially Britain, but also the US and Germany exerted 
considerable influence over other countries and clearly emerge as anchors. We further 
included specific country pairs in the regressions, again interacted with time dummies. 
These results (not reported here) also confirm the emergence of anchors and give a clear 
suggestion of bloc building. Blocs of monetary policy emerged along the lines of political 
alignments and trade relationships. For example, the Scandinavian countries, Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway strongly align with the UK, especially in the crisis and post-crisis 
episode. Central European countries, such as Austria use Germany as an anchor and this 
relationship can be observed throughout the whole time period. The US is only a weak 
anchor for some countries, such as the Netherlands in post gold standard years, 
confirming its slow emergence as the world international center in the inter-war period. 
Our results mirror a recent discussion of the Swedish example by Straumann and Woitek 
(2008).  
  
5. Probit Analysis of Bloc Selection 
 
In this section, we analyze the critical economic elements for the selection of the 
currency blocs. Following Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) we know that existing trade 
relationships played an important role. Based on Wandschneider (2008) and Wolf (2008) 
we also know that in addition to the pattern of trade integration, deflationary pressures, 
the experience of banking crises, the cover ratio, which determines a country’s further 
ability to defend gold, unemployment and political pressures determined a country’s 
decision to leave the gold standard. We therefore assume that these variables also 
influenced the decision of which currency bloc to join. In the following, we test a   15
country’s decision to join the Sterling bloc, the Reichsmark bloc or remain within the 
Gold bloc, using bivariate probit anlysis. In addition to geographic factors that might 
have influenced this decision, we control for trade, a common inflation experience, as 
well as the volatility of exchange rates among potential bloc members.    
 
Let P(Z) = PR (D = 1│Z) denote the probability  or propensity score of participation in a 
currency arrangement conditional on Z. To estimate the propensity score, Persson (2001) 
and similarly Barro and Tenreyro (2003) suggest using the geographical characteristics of 
the gravity model. However, this potentially misses the most important driving force of 
self-selection into currency arrangements, namely the level of bilateral trade integration 
among the future members of an arrangement. Using only the gravity variables implies 
that by definition trade integration unexplained in a gravity model will not be taken into 
account. However, since the work of Hamilton and Winters (1992), Frankel and Wei 
(1993), and Baldwin (1994), the gravity model has become the standard tool for assessing 
the degree of economic integration between countries. Deviations between observed and 
predicted trade may therefore be interpreted as a proxy for economic integration beyond 
the gravity model itself. Hence, the inclusion of trade after controlling for gravity 
variables should allow us to estimate how trade integration affects the probability to join 
into currency arrangements.  
 
To fix ideas, we borrow the idea of Alesina and Barro (2002) that currency arrangements 
typically form around anchor countries. The concept of client-anchor relationships in 
currency arrangements seems well adapted to the political rivalry among Europe’s 
powers after World War I. The currency agreements and trade blocs we look at were as 
follows. For the classification and for further references, see Eichengreen and Irwin 
(1995) and Ritschl and Wolf (2003): (i)  Gold bloc: five countries of our sample that remained on the gold standard to 
1936, namely France, the Netherlands, Belgium (to 1935), Switzerland, and 
Poland 
(ii)  Sterling bloc: five countries of our sample that left the gold standard in 1931/2 
and tied their currencies to the British pound, namely Great Britain, Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.  
(iii)  Reichsmark bloc: seven countries of our sample formerly on the gold standard 
that had currency pegs to the Reichsmark around 1937/38, namely Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece.  
 
To obtain the propensity scores for entering a currency arrangement, we estimate separate 
binary choice models for these three currency blocs. The dependent variable in each 
regression is the respective membership dummy for currency arrangements,  , 
defined as a time-invariant group effect or Fixed Effect on all future members of currency 
arrangements. For each country pair ij, it takes the value of one if both countries i and j 
will be members of the same currency arrangement in the 1930s, and zero else. The 
regressors are the observed bilateral trade flows of 1928, the trade with each of the three 
anchor countries in 1928, the usual gravity controls for potential trade, as well as the 
volatility of exchange rates over the period January 1925 – October 1928 and the average 
inflation differential over this same period. As the currency arrangements in question 
were all formed during or after the Great Depression, and as the Great Depression was 
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where Xij denotes the matrix of trade flow variables and other controls for 1928, and 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution (Table 5).  
 
(Table 5a,b,c about here) 
  
The coefficients on trade with the anchor countries all have the expected signs. The level 
of trade integration with an anchor country in 1928 helps to predict whether another 
country will join into a currency arrangement anchored by that country in the 1930s. This 
relation holds especially for countries that traded intensely with Britain in 1928, namely 
the Scandinavian countries in our sample. Also, countries that traded intensively with 
Germany in 1928 were more likely to be members of the Reichsmark in the 1930s as 
countries that traded intensively with France were somewhat more likely to stay on Gold. 
However note that the predictive power of trade integration with France and Germany for 
future membership in currency blocs is much more limited (This can be seen from 
expectation-prediction tables, available from the authors on request.). Moreover, the 
results suggest that countries which experienced a high degree of exchange rate volatility 
prior to the Great Depression were more likely to develop a peg to the Reichsmark, 
eflecting the experience of Austria and Hungary.   r
 
6. Conclusion 
Our paper offers a brief look at central bank reaction functions for a panel of countries 
during the inter-war period. The starting point for our investigation were the questions of 
what determined the interwar monetary policy and to what extent countries aligned their 
policies in monetary policy blocs. We find that during the interwar period countries 
moved away from the sole target of convertibility and towards a ‘modern’ monetary 
policy based on exchange rate stabilization. However, the extent of that new monetary   18
policy is still limited and not yet based on output stabilization or even modern price level 
targeting.  
 
We also find clear evidence for the emergence of monetary blocs, following patterns of 
trade alignments. Countries joining the Reichsmark bloc, also shared the common 
experience of a high degree of exchange rate variation prior to the Great Depression.  
 
Countries’ interwar policy choices offer lessons for countries remaining in or choosing to 
join the European Monetary Union today. Especially facing the current financial crisis, 
some prospective EMU member states would like to speed up the process of membership, 
while other countries’ plans might have been derailed for years following financial 
difficulty.  From our research, it is clear that the experience of the Great Depression did 
lead to a fracturing of the gold standard, but it did not shatter all exchange rate 
alignments. We find that domestic factors mattered for the formulation of monetary 
policy, but that policies implemented by major neighbors became dominant during the 
crisis. In fact some countries decided to link their fates even closer, especially small 
countries with already tight economic relations to a major neighbor. A key selection 
criterion into one monetary policy bloc rather than another was the degree of trade 
integration with anchor countries such as the UK, France, or Germany. We conclude that 
countries that are currently considering membership in the EMU should get strong 
support from the EMU to tighten real economic relations in terms of trade and factor 
markets.    19
Table 1a: Reaction Functions 
 
MODEL 1  MODEL 2  random 
effects 
MODEL 3    fixed 
effects 
VARIABLE 
Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob. 
Constant  9.155631 0.0172 9.155631 0.0172 0.074982 0.9861 
Dummy 1929-32  -13.21433 0.0013 -13.21433 0.0013 -11.67989 0.0003 
Dummy 1933-36  -11.70676 0.0030 -11.70676 0.0030 -10.53088 0.0006 
Cover 1925-29  0.040016 0.3564 0.040016 0.3564 -2.005975 0.0865 
Cover 1929-32  -0.464940 0.0262 -0.464940 0.0262 -2.329812 0.0001 
Cover 1933-36  -0.460171 0.0357 -0.460171 0.0357 -0.404603 0.0636 
Exchange rate 1925-
29  -0.018004 0.0483 -0.018004 0.0483 0.177307 0.0458 
Exchange rate 1929-
32  -0.017930 0.3367 -0.017930 0.3367 0.200093 0.0401 
Exchange rate 1933-
36  0.013553 0.0007 0.013553 0.0007 0.313300 0.0239 
Adj. R squared  0.020548 0.020548 0.044097 
N obs  78 78 78 
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Table 1b: Reaction Functions 
 
MODEL 1  MODEL 2  random 
effects 
MODEL 3    fixed 
effects 
VARIABLE 
Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob. 
Constant  -2.807685 0.0008 -2.807685 0.0008 0.074982 0.0030 
Dummy 1929-32  -1.522312 0.4172 -1.522312 0.4172 -10.88020 0.4371 
Dummy 1933-36  0.876559 0.4740 0.876559 0.4740 -1.484476 0.9837 
Cover 1925-29  -0.000672 0.6078 -0.000672 0.6078 -0.027251 0.6241 
Cover 1929-32  -2.642938 0.0002 -2.642938 0.0002 -0.000638 0.0001 
Cover 1933-36  -0.037271 0.6142 -0.037271 0.6142 -2.710232 0.6255 
X-rate 1925-29  0.015074 0.0479 0.015074 0.0479 -0.036168 0.0137 
X-rate 1929-32  -0.006964 0.7080 -0.006964 0.7080 0.204642 0.0306 
X-rate 1933-36  0.007958 0.0457 0.007958 0.0457 0.198928 0.0190 
Inflation 1925-29  1.604984 0.0027 1.604984 0.0027 0.311056 0.0018 
Inflation 1929-32  0.215015 0.7940 0.215015 0.7940 1.663348 0.6127 
Inflation 1933-36  -0.395728 0.4687 -0.395728 0.4687 0.417768 0.4585 
Adj. R squared  0.037418 0.037418 0.039641 
N obs  142 142 142 
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Table 2: Granger Causalities (country A - read horizontal, country B - read vertical) 
R stands for reject. We rejected the null hypothesis that country A does not Granger 

















































AU  -  R  R   R R   R      R   R        R    R R R R 
BE    -        R                     R 
BU      -       R     R       R       R    
CH      R  -    R         R               
CZ    R    -     R   R  R             R   R   R 
DE    R    R  -    R     R  R  R    R  R  R    R   R 
EST     R     -        R  R    R  R     R   
FI   R        R   -     R           R      R R R 
FR              -       R                
GE
R 
R  R  R   R  R    R   - R  R  R        R   R  R  R  R 
GR    R     R    R     -       R   R    R   R 
HU  R      R  R  R  R     R  -  R       R  R   R  R  R  R 
IT     R         R      R   -   R  R        R   R 
LAT    R          R    R   R  -             
LIT               R              -    R    R R   R 
NL       R       R          R    R  -     R R R    
NO    R    R  R    R     R   R    R  -  R    R   R 
PL    R     R  R  R   R  R   R  R    R  -    R  R   
PO  R    R   R   R  R   R  R   R    R  R  R  -   R  R   
RO         R               R      -     
SW     R   R R   R    R  R   R    R    R      -  R  
UK  R    R   R R   R    R  R   R    R    R  R   R -  R 
US                  R        R     R  R   R  - 
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Table 3: Reaction Functions – Anchor Countries 
 
VARIABLE Coeff.  Prob 
Dummy 1929-32  -169.9459  0.0056 
Dummy 1933-36  -125.2442  0.0857 
FRCover 25-29  0.247430  0.0308 
UKCover 25-29  -1.339066  0.4766 
GERCover 25-29  -4.411827  0.0369 
FRCover 29-32  1.193942  0.3353 
UKCover 29-32  -4.092476  0.2149 
GERCover29-32 -18.65318  0.0001 
FRCover 33-36  0.229880  0.8326 
UKCover 33-36  -0.756667  0.3356 
GERCover 33-36  -0.449504  0.2482 
FRExchange 25-29  -13.89975  0.0829 
UKExchange 25-29  -0.091309  0.1579 
GERExchange 25-29  -2.089203  0.1153 
FRExchange 29-32  30.15508  0.0247 
UKExchange 29-32  0.275831  0.0228 
GERExchange 29-32  4.911278  0.0298 
FRExchange 33-36  19.80730  0.2810 
UKExchange 33-36  0.256144  0.2355 
GERExchange 33-36  3.276800  0.2350 
FRInflation 25-29  3.242364  0.0312 
UKInflation 25-29  -0.756305  0.5872 
GERInflation 25-29  7.057382  0.1075 
FRInflation 29-32  -0.595737  0.5580 
UKInflation 29-32  6.606281  0.1153 
GERInflation 29-32  15.56793  0.1241 
FRInflation 33-36  2.117324  0.5881 
UKInflation 33-36  0.049876  0.9200 
GERInflation 33-36  0.550442  0.3192 
Adj. R squared  0.149879 
N obs  142   23
Table 4: Reaction Functions – Testing for Anchors 
MODEL 1   MODEL 2          Fixed 
Effects 
VARIABLE 
Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob. 
Constant  -4.928427 0.0019  -12.36865  0.0052 
Dummy 1929-32  3.228847 0.2611  2.640758  0.3449 
Dummy 1933-36  2.085360 0.4298  1.652956  0.5584 
Cover 1925-29  -0.000425 0.6972  -0.000376  0.7261 
Cover 1929-32  -1.572425 0.0052  -1.610551  0.0046 
Cover 1933-36  -0.048368 0.1962  -0.045065  0.2171 
X-rate 1925-29  0.144547 0.0275  0.623195  0.0161 
X-rate 1929-32  -0.016261 0.8756  0.499142  0.0663 
X-rate 1933-36  0.079346 0.6859  0.692435  0.0812 
Inflation 1925-29  1.278153 0.0055  1.348018  0.0029 
Inflation 1929-32  -0.365939 0.6306  -0.297719  0.7007 
Inflation 1933-36  -0.646759 0.1023  -0.580355  0.1552 
Bank Rate UK  9.790215 0.0003  10.00296  0.0002 
Bank Rate France  -0.728201 0.7725  -0.625351  0.7954 
Bank Rate Germany  8.298437 0.0017  7.727360  0.0043 
Bank Rate US  7.845023 0.0697  7.743406  0.0720 
Bank Rate UK 1929-36  15.45374 0.0021  14.90515  0.0029 
Bank Rate France 1929-36  1.559681 0.5669  1.448213  0.5827 
Bank Rate Germany 1929-36  -8.462726 0.0264  -7.915637  0.0378 
Bank Rate US 1929-36  -4.078919 0.5194  -3.772415  0.5473 
Adj. R squared  0.118604 0.122108 
N obs  142 142 
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Table 5a: Probit Analysis - Sterling Bloc 
Dependent Variable: STR_IN 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
        
    
Variable Coefficient Prob.   
        








        
    
S.E. of regression  0.093667  
Mean dependent var  0.05848  
S.D. dependent var  0.234992  
Nobs 342  
McFadden R-squared  0.887943  
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Table 5b: Probit Analysis - Reichsmark Bloc 
Dependent Variable: RM_IN     
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
   
   Model 1     Model 2    
        
Variable  Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
             
        
CONSTANT 8.181501 0.0006 11.56887 0.0076 
LOG(GDP_1*GDP_2) -0.258084 0.0709 -0.555522 0.0269 
LOG(DISTANCE) -0.839736 0.0044 -0.904679 0.1042 
LOG(1+TRADE28) -0.028656 0.8369 0.187233 0.4389 
LANGUAGE -0.246673 0.6577 -0.361272 0.6262 
BORDER 0.247746 0.4312 -0.314628 0.5385 
LOG(1+TRADE28)*GE 0.20292 0.0031 0.400411 0.0007 
FXVAR25_28     0.847806 0.0001 
AVID25_28     -0.000779 0.9975 
              
        
S.E. of regression  0.2828   0.192689  
Mean dependent var  0.102339   0.073529  
S.D. dependent var  0.303538   0.261485  
Nobs 342   272  
McFadden R-squared  0.209134   0.439119  
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Table 5c: Probit Analysis - Gold Bloc 
Dependent Variable: GOLD_IN    
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
   
   Model 1     Model 2    
      
Variable  Coefficient Prob.    Coefficient Prob.  
              
      
C 4.539375 0.0507  5.948918 0.0248
LOG(GDP_1*GDP_2) 0.009843 0.954  0.106603 0.5712
LOG(DISTANCE) -0.992086 0.0024  -1.301099 0.0013
LOG(1+TRADE28) -0.018904 0.9135  -0.243795 0.2625
LANGUAGE 0.576159 0.4447  1.029886 0.2739
BORDER -0.774026 0.065  -0.66885 0.1505
FXVAR25_28     -1.082099 0.116
AVID25_28     -0.014766 0.9259
LOG(1+TRADE28)*FR 0.214234 0.0048 0.183972 0.0216
              
      
S.E. of regression  0.213145   0.233174
Mean dependent var  0.05848   0.073529
S.D. dependent var  0.234992   0.261485
Nobs 342   272
McFadden R-squared  0.246315   0.299591
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